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Superworlds - Supplemental - United States v Callaghan
🕑 Added 2023-06-28 12:32:20 +0000 UTCCASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2000
–-------------
‘UNITED STATES V CALLAGHAN’
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Argued August 3, 2001 – Decided August 6, 2001
-(Selected extracts)-
REHNQUIST C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which STEVENS, O’CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTHER, THOMAS, GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined.
…rarely has a case come before this Court representing so blatant a contempt for Constitutional rights. The shameless manner in which the Department of Justice has acted in this matter should not simply be a cause for condemnation but alarm, being utterly unfounded in either statute or the common law. It is rare that the Justices of this Court find themselves so united in their determination, but the Court draws no pleasure in this unity, given its catalyst in such flagrant governmental overreach…
…the United States’ arguments are universally without merit. The ramshackle way in which the Appellant’s myriad grounds have arisen, fallen away and been replaced throughout these proceedings speaks to a troubling indifference on behalf of those prosecuting this matter to their fundamental duties, to the judicious exercise of litigator discretion, and to the principles of unbiased governance. It is clear to the members of this Court that the United States has pursued with unfettered obsession the attainment of a specific outcome, namely the acquisition of Mr Callaghan’s genetic material, irrespective of how or whether this outcome is supported by facts or law. This Court condemns, in the strongest possible terms, such nakedly unprincipled executive action, which is anathema to the principles of justice and the rule of law upon which this country is based. Were it not for the high public profile of Mr Callaghan and the clear public interest in denouncing the Appellant’s conduct, this application for certiorari would have been dismissed without hearing…
…The Appellant claims, in the first instance, that Mr Callaghan has an obligation, by the mere fact of any accusation of criminal wrongdoing or, implicitly, his mere presence on United States soil, to surrender personal genetic material as a matter of course and identification. This is patently incorrect and a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment’s right of the people to be secure in their persons…
…Pivoting from that contention, the Appellant next submitted in the alternative a litany of alleged criminal conduct by Mr Callaghan that they claimed supported the issue of a warrant. Chief among these, initially, were allegations of obstruction of justice, despite clear and well settled case law that such ancillary charges are not valid if the underlying charges against the accused are not properly obtained. There then followed the dual – and a reasonable observer would think contradictory – accusations that Mr Callaghan had breached regulations relating to the registration of powers by being unregistered or, in the alternative, that he had committed fraud by allowing the Department of Powers Registration to improperly register him as clairvoyant. The former of these accusations is plainly nonsensical, as Mr Callaghan was at all applicable times registered with the Department of Powers Regulation for the purposes of the relevant Acts. The latter of these accusations similarly cannot support any finding of wrongdoing, firstly because Mr Callaghan’s obligations to the Department did not extend to correcting unforced errors in the Department’s systems, and secondly because Mr Callaghan was a child at the time of the alleged offence. Mr Callaghan did not supply false information to the Department, and had the Department become aware that their conclusion regarding Mr Callaghan being clairvoyant was wrong at a time adjacent to Mr Callaghan’s assessment, Mr Callaghan would not have faced criminal charges. It is absurd to suggest that an act which would not have founded a warrant for arrest at the time it occurred should somehow found a warrant for arrest now. This is to say nothing of the presumption of doli incapax, which the Appellant in their levelling of accusations against Mr Callaghan seems to have pre‑emptively concluded did not warrant being addressed. The presumption is not rebutted. Matthew Callaghan was thirteen years of age at the time these alleged offences occurred, squarely within the range to which the presumption against criminal capacity applies. The Department of Powers Regulation, for its part, seems to be attempting to escape being tarred as incompetent by seeking to foster criminal responsibility onto a thirteen-year-old child. Such efforts are ineffective and, quite frankly, unbecoming…
…The Appellant also sought to rely on section 11 of the Empathic Individuals Regulation Act 1990’. Section 11 states:
Empathic Testing to be Mandatory
(1) Any law enforcement or otherwise designated official must, upon notice, issue an empathy testing order against:
a. Any adult whose powers are unregistered;
b. Any registered adult suspected to possess empathic abilities;
c. Any minor demonstrating empathic abilities;
d. Any minor who has obtained the age of 14 without demonstrating a registrable ability; or
e. Any person otherwise suspected to possess empathic abilities;
unless an empathy testing order has already been properly issued against and completed by that person.
(2) Any person issued with an empathy testing order must report within 3 days to a registered testing facility and complete the federally designated empathic ability test.
(3) Failure to comply with an empathic testing order within the given period creates a presumption of empathic abilities within the person against whom the order is issued, and is to be treated as a violation of Section 16 of this Act…
While the legitimacy of this legislation and its Constitutional viability remain untested, in circumstances where Mr Callaghan was never issued an empathy testing order such statutory consideration is unnecessary. The legislation clearly places upon law enforcement or otherwise designated officials the ability and impetus to issue empathy testing orders to individuals falling within certain categories. Whether Mr Callaghan did, at any point, fall into any one of those categories is irrelevant, as he carried no positive obligation at any point to seek out an empathic test. As above, any failure by United States officials to recognise Mr Callaghan’s condition does not impugn, nor criminalise Mr Callaghan’s actions…
…however even if Mr Callaghan was guilty of an arrestable offence, there is no requirement either at law or in the practice of law enforcement that an arrested individual surrender to arresting agencies their personal genetic material. The thrust of the Appellant’s submissions on this front, that the collection of Mr Callaghan’s blood would be no different to the routine taking of his fingerprints and therefore should be permitted or even ordered, is risible. Even were this Court convinced that the two are equatable, which it is not, the very existence of this suit and the clear fervour which the State has pursued it would raise per se concerns that said procedure was being undertaken for an improper purpose…
…We reject the State’s de facto claim to Mr Callaghan’s genetic material. We reject the Appellant’s contention that search and seizure requires no need to show probable cause or criminal conduct. We reject the allegation that Mr Callaghan has engaged in criminal conduct or that any probable cause exists upon which a warrant for his arrest could be based. We reject any assertion that he has engaged in obstruction of justice in the absence of founding charges. We reject the implicit contention that he is not entitled to the presumption of doli incapax. We reject that he has breached the Empathic Individuals Regulation Act and decline to confirm that Act’s constitutional validity. We reject the assertion that the existence of criminal charges carries with it a de facto requirement to submit to blood‑drawing procedures, that such procedures are a standard part of law enforcement process, or that such procedures are not in this case being pursued unreasonably and for improper purpose…
…We award the Defendant indemnity costs.
