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【國際冷知識 🇨🇳】 林和立教授的「習近平被動式認受」理論(一)「消極的合法性」等同「認受性」嗎?

🕑 Added 2026-01-28 02:01:01 +0000 UTC
【國際冷知識 🇨🇳】 林和立教授的「習近平被動式認受」理論(一)「消極的合法性」等同「認受性」嗎?

Comments

堅離地書院 College

Whether the CMC no.2 is holding "real" power is a mythical issue. As powerful as Lin Biao during the cultural revolution, planning a coup was still almost impossible.

堅離地書院 College

這是關鍵,對政權而言,犬儒比相信政權更理想

波路 保羅

暴君都可獲「被動式認受」,可以濃縮成一個詞 : 犬儒! 充斥在當今中、港社會的,是不信政權,但也不相信人民力量,不相信真理、倫理、公義、道德 ... , 以什麼都不相信的態度,來支持自己消極,來支持不願意為改變不公而需承擔代價的立場。extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c065-200101044.pdf

George

Despite being part of a rolling, yearslong clean-out of the PLA’s upper ranks, purging a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission is still qualitatively different. This political theatre piece sends a strong message that no one is untouchable. The way serious allegations are packaged shows that the Chairman is dogged in his effort to crush any residual factionalism, warning others that their survival hinges not on connections or seniority but on absolute loyalty. The fall of Zhang has sent waves of fear crashing against the PLA's risk-averse command culture. Disobedience and disloyalty are fused into a single sin: deviation from the Party’s absolute control. It‘ll accelerate a shift toward political signaling and box-ticking, enabling the Party to exert greater authority in pursuing political ends while reducing honest reporting up the chain. Furthermore, more political commissars and internal security organs will be embedded in sensitive units within the PLA and the state-owned nuclear industry to centralize and tighten control over military command. The question haunting the CCP now is not whether a military coup was successfully nipped in the bud or whether Zhang Youxia leaked nuclear secrets to the US. The deeper concern is whether the CCP is succumbing to the same authoritarian decay that doomed so many regimes before it, as officers scramble to demonstrate their loyalty after witnessing their peers being taken down one after another. History suggests that totalitarian regimes often see periods of apparent stability and prosperity in the short to medium term. Yet time and again, the self‑inflicted isolation that comes with absolute power—reinforced by the paranoia of yes‑man military subordinates and the absence of independent technocrats—inevitably dulls judgment and erodes societal vitality. Tragically, many rulers convince themselves that they’re immune to the same forces and capable of dictating their own fate. In the end, instead of learning from their predecessors’ failures, they only meet a similar fate. Clearly, Xi Jinping now needs to find a way to not only pivot political apathy away from fear and paranoia caused by taking down the military circle of his own—including most trusted princeling—but conceive a plan to follow through his “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and the reunification with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Jake Sullivan in an interview with the NYT shared the impression Zhang left on him during their meeting in which he brought up “nuclear weapons in the context of China’s overall military buildup.” It’s unusual for a former national security advisor to speak so unequivocally about the character of a military heavyweight, especially in the wake of accusations of corruption, disloyalty to the Party and the country—which is seen as posing a serious threat to Xi’s absolute leadership—and leaking nuclear secrets to the US. Such remarks will no doubt deepen Xi’s suspicion of US infiltration within the Chinese military and spoil the genial atmosphere ahead of the Trump-Xi summit in April. The CCP’s politics is obscured by a veil of mist. It remains shrouded in secrecy whether the latest wave of purges targeting senior military leaders and other figures will derail Xi’s ambitions to reboot China’s economic engine and place Taiwan in his hands via hybrid warfare, or push him toward a reckless decision to invade Taiwan amid the growing rift between the US and NATO, acting before the hard‑power gap between the US and mainland China widens further. Yet judging from what appears to characterize his thinking, he’s unlikely to do an about-face on his goals, nor is he willing to own up to his mistakes. Yet judging from what appears to characterize his thinking, he’s unlikely to do an about-face on his goals, nor is he willing to own up to his mistakes. Against all odds, the CCP’s ambition remains and will continue pushing for great-power influence, a stronger nuclear deterrent, and regional dominance. And yet a system that constantly purges its own top commanders, and that is run by fear and absolute loyalty, becomes more brittle and more prone to miscalculation. Should history repeat itself, Xi, the CCP, all mainlanders, and much of the world would find themselves entangled in a major conflict with far-reaching economic and political consequences. For anyone caught in the vortex of mainland China's unique politics, the concept of “passive political legitimacy” and “educated acquiescence” offers a revealing glimpse into the deeper fabric of society. Nietzsche's warning feels uncomfortably apt: a people under a regime that defines itself by rewriting the rules of the game and hunting down “monsters” risks complying with and becoming indistinguishable from the very forces it originally claims to oppose. The deeper the Party stares into the abyss of its own purges, the more that abyss begins to shape both the mentality of its people and its own destiny, creating what it calls a “community of common destiny.”


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